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The common law of defamation defined the balance between
free speech and reputation decisively in favor of reputation.1  It did
so lest “good men fall prey to foul rumor.”2 In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,3 decided during the ferment of the 1960s civil rights
movement in the South, the U.S. Supreme Court shifted radically
the common law of defamation, fashioning a rule that prevented
public officials from recovering for defamation unless they could
show that the defendant had acted with “actual malice.”4  In one
stroke, reputation was subjugated to free speech, the province of
state common law was subjected to federal constitutional law over-
sight, and the jury function was usurped by judges.5
* Professor of Law & Distinguished University Scholar, University of Louisville,
Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
** Dean and Vice President, Washington & Lee University School of Law.
1. See NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN:  AN INTERPRETIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 17 (1986).
2. Id. at 251.  Norman L. Rosenberg traces the colonial roots of this notion. See
generally id. He notes that President Richard Nixon in 1974 was concerned that libel
laws following Sullivan would discourage “good people” from running for “public of-
fice.” Id. at 251.
3. 376 U.S. 264, 283 (1964). See IAN LOVELAND, POLITICAL LIBELS:  A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY 65-83 (2002) (describing the case in comparative context).
4. The actual malice standard required public officials and later public figures to
show that those who defamed them knew that what they published was untrue, or that
the defamer acted with reckless disregard for the truth. See Curtis Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 389 U.S. 997 (1967).
5. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691 (1986). See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The New  York
Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV.
191; Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to “The Cen-
tral Meaning of the First Amendment,” 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 603-05, 613-14 (1983); Ar-
thur L. Berney, Libel and the First Amendment – A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L.
REV. 1 (1965).  For a critical appraisal, see Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v.
Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782 (1986).
57
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Although some commentators questioned whether the Court
needed to upset the fine balance of interests within the common
law and eliminate the common law of defamation that throughout
its development had always closely hewed to the social norms of the
society regulated,6 Sullivan continues to be a cornerstone of a
strong constitutional interpretation of civil rights.7 Its eloquent
rhetoric continues to center free speech at the apex of democratic
government.
Other liberal democracies have more recently begun to aban-
don the common law of defamation in favor of a more liberal ap-
proach to free speech.  Rather than trying to protect persons
against “foul rumour,” the balance has shifted in favor of an ap-
proach that perceives the press as an institution capable of fighting
governmental over-reaching and corruption.  In searching for mod-
els by which the press could more adequately perform its public
function, other countries began to closely examine the Sullivan
doctrine as a way to avoid the chilling effect of defamation rules.8
England, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand embraced the goal of
greater protection for free speech.  In each of these countries, Sulli-
van was seen as a harbinger, but was also criticized as suffering from
flaws that make it incompatible to transplant directly.9
6. See SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT CASES ON DEFAMATION TO 1600 (R.H. Helmholz
ed., 1985);  David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming? 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487
(1991).  Scholarly analysis of the balance ranges beyond American commentary. See
Denis W. Boivin, Accommodating Freedom of Expression and Reputation in the Common Law of
Defamation, 22 QUEEN’S L.J. 229 (1997); Charles Tingley, Reputation, Freedom of Expression
and the Tort of Defamation in the United States and Canada: A Deceptive Polarity, 37 ALTA. L.
REV. 620 (1999).
7. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); RANDALL P. BEZANSON, HOW FREE CAN THE PRESS BE? 7-57 (Robert W.
McChesney & John C. Nerone eds., 2003) (providing a rich description of New York
Times v. United States and its standing in press freedom); Russell L. Weaver & Geoffrey
Bennett, Is The New York Times “Actual Malice” Standard Really Necessary?  A Comparative
Examination, 53 LA. L. REV. 1153 (1993) [hereinafter “Weaver & Bennett”].
8. LOVELAND, supra note 3, at 87-114, 133-50.  Criticism of the actual malice stan- R
dard was extensive, even on its home turf, especially in the late 1980s. See Weaver &
Bennett, supra note 7, at 1154.  Comparative defamation law is likely to burgeon.  For
one attempt to measure the comparative law rules with an economic measure, see
Charles J. Hartmann & Stephen M. Renas, Anglo American Defamation Law:  A Compara-
tive Economic Analysis, 5 J. MEDIA L. & PRAC. 3 (1984).
9. See Weaver & Bennett, supra note 7.  This is not to say that innovative rules
that uncover truth would not be desirable.  It is not to say, either, that the Common-
wealth Courts, with their ability to craft and adapt the common law may, over time,
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In three Commonwealth countries, the courts have tried to ac-
complish the objective of protecting political speech through an
extension of the common law of qualified privilege.10  In Reynolds v.
Times Newspapers, the English House of Lords extended qualified
privilege to protect reporting on matters of public concern.11  In
Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corp., the Australian High Court
found that as long as the publisher acts reasonably, a qualified privi-
lege protects the publication of material pertaining to governmen-
tal and political matters affecting Australia’s representational
government structure.12  Finally, in Lange v. Atkinson, the New Zea-
land Court of Appeal articulated a common law privilege designed
to protect “generally-published statements made about the actions
and qualities of those currently or formerly elected to Parliament
and those with immediate aspirations to be members, so far as
fashion more efficacious defamation rules. See id. See also Michael Chesterman, The
Money or the Truth: Defamation Reform in Australia and the USA, 18 U.N.S.W.L.J. 300
(1995) (arguing that the Sullivan decision is ineffectual and perverse); Nadine Strossen,
A Defence of the Aspirations — But Not the Achievements — of the U.S. Rules Limiting Defama-
tion Actions by Public Officials or Public Figures, 15 MELB. U. L. REV. 419 (1986) (contend-
ing that Sullivan often has been unfairly attacked and that within the limits of a federal
constitutional law system and feckless legislatives unwilling to carry out fundamental
reforms, the actual malice rule has been successful in providing a greater freedom to
the press to publish political commentary).  Likewise, the Canadian courts have recog-
nized the value of the end to be achieved. See RAYMOND E. BROWN, 4 THE LAW OF
DEFAMATION IN CANADA 1096 (2d ed. 1999).  But they have not adopted Sullivan as the
route.  The Canadian Supreme Court in Hill v. Church of Scientology [1995] 2 S.C.R.
1130, found that the common law satisfactorily balanced the interest consistent with
freedom of speech under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
10. See 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 276, stating that:
The qualified or conditionally privileged communication is one made in
good faith on any subject matter in which the person communicating has
an interest, or in reference to which he has a right or duty, if made to a
person having a corresponding interest or duty on a privileged occasion
and in a manner and under circumstances fairly warranted by the occasion
and duty, right or interest.  The essential elements are good faith, an inter-
est to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper
occasion, and publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only.
The privilege arises from the necessity of full and unrestricted communica-
tion concerning a matter in which the parties have an interest or duty.  The
transmitter must have an interest or duty in the subject matter, and the
addressee must have a corresponding interest or duty, but such duty may be
moral or social, rather than a legal one.
See also Knudsen v. Kansas Gas and Electric Co., 807 P.2d 71 (1991).
11. [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 204 (appeal taken from H.L.) (U.K.).
12. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520, 521 (Austl.).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR103.txt unknown Seq: 4 20-FEB-06 12:19
60 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
those actions and qualities directly affect or affected their capacity
(including their personal ability and willingness) to meet their pub-
lic responsibilities.”13
This article examines the Sullivan decision and the recent ex-
tensions of qualified privilege.  We conclude that the balance be-
tween free speech and reputation in liberal democracies has shifted
strongly in favor of free speech; however, the precise balance that
each liberal democracy develops will differ according to constitu-
tional, historical, and social settings.  We should be slow to cele-
brate Sullivan as a distillation of wisdom.  In an interconnected
world, tolerance will have to be shown to differing balances of free
speech and reputation.
II. THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
Attempts to limit public speech are part of a broad theme in
English history and, by definition, the United States and Australia.
Prior to the invention of the printing press, communication was
limited to oral and handwritten methods that were slow, inaccurate,
and confined.  The development of the printing press had a dra-
matic effect by making it possible to mass-produce writings, includ-
ing criticisms of the government.  Because of the potential for
widespread distribution of potentially seditious writings, the English
Crown came to view this invention as dangerous and threatening.
As a result, the Crown sought to restrict the public’s use of the
printing press.14  Through the late seventeenth century, the Crown
imposed licensing schemes that required publishers to obtain offi-
cial approval before publishing.15
13. [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. 22 (H.C.).
14. See William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Ex-
pression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 97-98 (1984); ROSENBERG, supra note 1; LINDSAY M.
KAPLAN, THE CULTURE OF SLANDER IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (1997); RUSSELL L.
WEAVER & ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 279 (2002).
15. See Mayton, supra note 14, at 104 n.75. See also Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60, 65 (1960) (describing the fact that John Lilburne was “whipped, pilloried and
fined” in England for refusing to answer questions regarding the distribution of books,
and the fact that Puritan ministers were sentenced to death for writing, printing and
publishing books).
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Beginning in 1606 with the decision in de Libellis Famosis,16 the
Star Chamber created the crime of seditious libel17 in part to re-
place the crime of constructive treason.18  Seditious libel made it a
crime to criticize the government or governmental officials (and, at
one point, the clergy as well).19  The crime was justified by the no-
tion that criticism of the government “inculcated a disrespect for
public authority.”20  “Since maintaining a proper regard for govern-
ment was the goal of this new offense, it followed that truth was just
as reprehensible as falsehood” and therefore was not a defense.21
Indeed, truthful criticisms were punished more severely because it
was assumed that true criticisms could be more damaging to the
government.22
Although the crime of seditious libel began to wane in En-
gland in the late eighteenth century,23 it had already been imposed
in the American colonies.  The most famous incident involved the
1735 prosecution of John Peter Zenger,24 a printer, who was prose-
cuted for printing “many things derogatory of the dignity of his
16. 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (Star Chamber 1606).
17. For a thorough discussion of the history of seditious libel, see LAW COMMIS-
SION, WORKING PAPER NO. 72, CODIFICATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: TREASON, SEDITION
AND ALLIED OFFENCES, London (1977); Judith Schenck Koffler & Bennett L. Gershman,
The New Seditious Libel, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 816 (1984); Philip Hamburger, The Develop-
ment of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1985).
See also Jeffrey K. Walker, A Poisen in Ye Commonwealth: Seditious Libel in Hanoverian
London, 25 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 341, 366 (1996).
18. See Mayton, supra note 14, at 98, 100-01 (defining constructive treason as the
“generic name” of the offenses that were prosecuted for speech “hostile to the
government”).
19. See Mayton, supra note 14, at 91.  Indeed, in de Libellis Famosis, the defendants
had ridiculed high clergy. See Mayton, supra note 14, at 103.
20. Mayton, supra note 14. See also Matt J. O’Laughlin, Exigent Circumstances: Cir-
cumscribing the Exclusionary Rule in Response to 9/11, 70 UMKC L. REV. 707, 720-21 (2002)
(discussing the seditious libel prosecution of John Wilkes during the reign of George
III); LOUIS KRONENBERGER, THE EXTRAORDINARY MR. WILKES: HIS LIFE AND TIMES (1974).
21. De Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (Star Chamber 1686). See also William
R. Glendon, The Trial of John Peter Zenger, 68 N.Y. ST. B.J. 48, 49 (1996).
22. Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to Determine the Law
in Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 184 n.290 (1998). See also Glen-
don, supra note 21, at 48.
23. Koffler & Gershman, supra note 17, at 822.  See LAW COMMISSION, WORKING
PAPER NO. 72, CODIFICATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: TREASON, SEDITION AND ALLIED OF-
FENCES, London (1977); R. v. Bow Street Magistrates Court Ex. p. Choudury [1991] 1
Q.B. 429.
24. See Glendon, supra note 21.
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majesty’s government, reflecting upon the legislature, upon the
most considerable persons in the most distinguished stations in the
province, and tending to raise seditions and tumults among the
people thereof.”25  In what is widely regarded as the first American
case of jury nullification, the jury refused to convict Zenger even
though he had effectively admitted all of the elements of the
crime.26
The crime remained in effect even after the Constitution was
adopted.  In 1798, when the country was on the verge of war with
France, the U.S. Congress adopted the Alien and Sedition Acts.27
The Acts were widely viewed as an effort by the Federalists to sup-
press Jeffersonian Republicans.28  The Acts had two parts.  The
“first part . . . proscribed organized opposition to public measures.
The second made it illegal to criticize government, provided the
criticism was malicious, untrue, alienated the people’s affections
from their government, or brought the government into the con-
tempt of the people.”29  In the States as well, there were prosecu-
25. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 140 n.18 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).  In
particular, Zenger referred to the Royal Governor of New York (William Cosby) as “a
large spaniel, of about 5 feet 5 inches high . . . lately strayed from his kennel with his
mouth full of fulsome panegyricks” and as a “monkey . . . lately broke free from his
chain and run into the country.”  Elizabeth I. Haynes, United States v. Thomas: Pulling
the Jury Apart, 30 CONN. L. REV. 731 (1998).  Zenger also described the Governor as a
tyrant.  See Glendon, supra note 21, at 50.
26. Glendon, supra note 21, at 52.  The Zenger case was not the only seditious libel
prosecution in the American colonies.  Another prosecution arose out of former Gover-
nor Josias Fendall’s 1681 “rebellion.”  Fendall was prosecuted for “false scandalous mu-
tinous and seditious’ speech (i.e., that the Proprietor was a traitor who had formed a
Catholic-Indian conspiracy to ruin the colony’s Protestants, that anyone who paid the
Proprietor’s taxes was a fool, and that Fendall would protect the people against Lord
Baltimore), attempted rebellion, and attempting to seize Lord Baltimore and several
members of the Council.” See Krauss, supra note 22, at 151.
27. John Harrison, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789-1801, By
David P. Currie, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 392-93 (1998) (book review) (“The govern-
ment was on the verge of war with France and faced, many of its leaders believed, a
disloyal opposition that was in the French pocket.  That is the kind of situation that
brings out the worst in rulers, but the worst it brought out of Congress was still arguably
within the Constitution.”).
28. See Thomas Kane, Malice, Lies, and Videotape: Revisiting New York Times v. Sulli-
van in the Modern Age of Political Campaigns, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 755, 766 (1999).
29. James P. Martin, When Repression is Democratic and Constitutional: The Federalist
Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 117, 122-23 (1999)
(noting that the significance of the first part “has been virtually ignored by
commentators”).
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tions for seditious libel or their equivalents (i.e., contempt of court
for free expression).30  During the Civil War, seditious libel prose-
cutions were routine,31 and there were a variety of prosecutions in
the twentieth century, all designed to suppress dissent against gov-
ernment policies.32
30. See Seth F. Kreimer, The Pennsylvania Constitution’s Protection of Free Expression, 5
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 12, 16-17 (2002).  In the 1788 case Republica v. Oswald, Eleazer Os-
wald, a newspaper man, was subjected to civil arrest and a libel suit by one of his politi-
cal opponents (Andrew Browne who was described as the “master of a female academy
in the city of Philadelphia”). Id. at 16.  When Oswald published an editorial attacking
all parties to the libel action, claiming that they were motivated by political concerns, he
was charged with contempt of court. Id. at 17.  Justice McKean, another of Oswald’s
political opponents, wrote an opinion in which he asserted that “libeling is a great
crime, whatever sentiments may be entertained by those who live by it” and that “the
heart of the libeler . . . is more dark and base than that of the assassin.” Id.  Although
Justice McKean recognized the importance of free expression (which he viewed as giv-
ing “every citizen a right of investigating the conduct of those who are intrusted [sic]
with the public business”), he nonetheless found that Oswald’s attack was unprotected:
the “object and tendency” was to “raise a prejudice against his antagonist, in the minds
of those that must ultimately determine the dispute between them” and to “dishonor
the administration of justice.”  As a result, Oswald was subject to punishment for con-
tempt of court. Id.
31. See Koffler & Gershman, supra note 17, at 829-30, explaining:
After the expiration of the Sedition Act of 1798, seditious libel did not
emerge again until the time of the Civil War, when it surfaced not in the
lineaments of legislation but under the heavy hand of the commander in
chief, President Lincoln. . . . Thousands of suspected or known dissenters
and suspected ‘dangerous’ men were thrown into military prisons without
charges and without trial.  Thus, although seditious libel was missing from
the statute books, it animated an executive dragnet that resulted in the ar-
rest of thousands of men.  Lincoln’s executive fiat was more despotic and
crushing than the statutory form of seditious libel; its broad sweep ren-
dered virtually insignificant in comparison the estimated twenty-five arrests
under the Sedition Act of 1798. Furthermore, Lincoln’s actions forged a
precedent for the resuscitation of seditious libel whenever the executive
feels it necessary to protect the national security, thereby retaining, at least
in periods of felt crisis, the myth that only an irrefragable authority can save
the people.
32. During and immediately after World War I, there were a number of prosecu-
tions under the inaptly named Espionage Act. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten,
244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).  For later similar decisions, see Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Braden v. United
States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v.
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Government, in a broader sense, was no friend of free
speech.33  While the history of seditious libel provides a window to
government regulation, another revealing perspective is provided
by the use of the government’s taxing power of the press and there-
fore of knowledge.  As Professor Bezanson says, the “values of access
to public audiences and freedom from government control over
dissemination of information and opinion to the body politic
emerged early from the struggle against the stamp.”34  To tax the
dissemination of knowledge was to control effectively its flow.35
III. THE SULLIVAN DECISION
Prior to the landmark case of Sullivan, the common law world
was remarkably uniform in balancing free speech, reputation, and
the public interest in the way just described. Sullivan was to sound
the death knell for the crime of seditious libel in the United States.
In Sullivan, the Court concluded in dicta that the Sedition Act was
inconsistent with the “central meaning of the First Amendment.”36
Sullivan’s dicta was confirmed in Garrison v. Louisiana.37  In Sulli-
van, Justice Black went on to argue that the Sedition Act “by com-
mon consent has generally been treated as having been a wholly
unjustifiable and much to be regretted violation of the First
Amendment.”38  As Professor Harry Kalven in his influential article
on the meaning of Sullivan stated, “[t]he concept of seditious libel
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). See also Kof-
fler & Gershman, supra note 17, at 841-42.
33. Some have argued that the government can be a friend of speech. See, e.g.,
OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 83 (1996) (forcefully arguing that the Govern-
ment may be a friend of speech).
34. RANDALL P. BEZANSON, TAXES ON KNOWLEDGE IN AMERICA: EXACTIONS ON THE
PRESS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 45 (1994).
35. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).  No abstruse lessons
in law and economics are necessary to recognize the simple truth of Pigou’s theories of
incentives on voluntary activities created by tax levies. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (relying on social cost theory but pointing to limits
of Pigou’s theory).
36. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 273.
37. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
38. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 296 (Black, J., concurring).
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strikes at the very heart of democracy . . . [D]efamation of the gov-
ernment is an impossible notion for a democracy.”39
The other trammel on free speech, the government’s power of
taxation, was addressed outside of Sullivan in a series of Supreme
Court decisions finding that government could not discriminate
against the press by its expression or administration of the taxation
power.40  The burdens on speech were particularly suspect because
government was acting, as it did in the Star Chamber, to regulate
speech directly. Sullivan, however, was concerned with analyzing
not governmental speech regulation, but its more indirect regula-
tion through affording recovery to individuals whose reputations
are besmirched by defamatory imputations.  Defamatory speech
had not traditionally been at the core of First Amendment con-
cerns.  The crucible of the civil rights movement illuminated the
costs of the common law of defamation and the past constitutional
deference to it.
Sullivan struck a mortal blow against the restraints imposed by
civil defamation rules.  Since most political speech of substance
takes place in the media, and the pre-Sullivan law of libel applied a
strict form of liability that made words tending to defame another
actionable upon publication, “a defendant incurs liability even
though he reasonably believes in the truth of the statement.”41  Tra-
duced politicians, like any citizen, could establish a case by simply
showing that defamatory words about them were published.42  The
defendant publisher could then assert a defense by establishing the
truth of the defamatory implication, proving that it was published
in a privileged context, or showing it was a fair comment on a mat-
39. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 205. See also Michael T. Gibson, The Su-
preme Court and Freedom of Expression from 1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 272
(1986).  As noted by the Sullivan Court, “the attack upon [the Sedition Act’s] validity
has carried the day in the court of history.”   376 U.S. at 276.
40. See Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575 (1983); Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987);
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439  (1991); BEZANSON, supra note 34, at 252-83.
41. GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER ¶ 1.16 (Patrick Milmo & W.V.H. Rogers eds.,
10th ed. 2004).
42. Technically, the words must identify the plaintiff, i.e., be “of and concerning”
the plaintiff. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277.
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ter of public interest.  The burden of proof was on the publisher to
establish these defenses.
Sullivan changed common law doctrine and practice in the
United States.  In terms of doctrine, a matter of private law was
brought under the ambit of First Amendment constitutional juris-
prudence.  This ensured both that greater prominence would be
given to the value of free speech and that state law would be unable
to resist the onward march of the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent.
By turning the issue into one of constitutional law, the role of the
jury was diminished, signaling that the jury was no longer to be en-
tirely trusted to balance public and private rights.43
Under the common law, governmental officials had ample
scope to suppress or punish their critics.  The cases from various
common law countries such as England, Australia, and the United
States follow common fact patterns.  In Sullivan, a governmental
official (a county commissioner) brought a libel action against civil
rights activists who were deemed to have criticized his performance
in office.44  Likewise, in two of the prominent Australian decisions,
Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd.45 and Lange v. Australian
Broadcasting Corp.46 governmental officials (in the latter case, a New
Zealand official) brought suit against the Australian media.  Finally,
in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., an English decision, the action
43. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278-79. See Newton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 930 F.2d 662
at 666 (9th Cir. 1990) (giving the media assurance under Sullivan of “the ability to write
and publish freely without risking vindictive reprisals from local juries”).  This was
ironic given the jury’s foundational role in the scheme of freedoms protected by the
Constitution.  The jury’s centrality was articulated most eloquently by Justice White in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968).  For a discussion of the role of the
jury in the republican scheme of the U.S. Constitution, see David F. Partlett, The Republi-
can Model and Punitive Damages, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1409, 1420-24 (2004).  Concerns
about governing the jury arise in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on Punitive
Damages. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003)
(striking the due process limits of the imposition of punitive damages); Pac. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1991) (O’Conner, J. dissenting) (explicitly expres-
sing concern).  At the same time, the constitutional role of the jury, after a period of
decline, has been reasserted in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and most
recently in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
44. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254.
45. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd., (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104 (Austl.).
46. Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp., (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520, 521.
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arose when a newspaper allegedly defamed Ireland’s then recently
resigned Tiaoseach (Prime Minister).47
In terms of changes in practice, the Sullivan decision effec-
tively ended civil defamation suits by public officials in the United
States.  For the U.S. Supreme Court, the jury’s proclivities were too
dangerous; the First Amendment could not be subject to a populist
examiner.  Herbert Wechsler, attorney for the New York Times, ef-
fectively argued before the Court that historic overreaching sig-
naled present dangers.48  In the process, however, defamation law
in the United States became highly constitutionalized and was
stripped of the common law superstructure that had developed
over hundreds of years.  For example, the burden of proving truth
and actual malice shifted to the plaintiff, in contrast to the common
law where a defendant needed to assert such facts as a defense.
Revolutions in the law, like all revolutions, lead to uncertainty.
The changes in libel law are no exception, and the rebuilding of
the law through constitutional analysis has been a stumbling pro-
cess.  The law relating to comment is an example of the Supreme
Court finding the wicket rather sticky when it enters common law
analysis.  Not unremarkably, where law is built quickly, dicta is re-
lied upon as doctrinal cement.  In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,49 Jus-
tice Powell suggested that opinion, as distinct from fact, could
never be defamatory.50  There then ensued a body of law built upon
47. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 134, 3 W.L.R. 1010,
1014 (H.L.).
48. See Kane, supra note 28, at 767, citing ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE
SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6 (1991) (comparing civil cause of action for
libel to Sedition Act).
49. 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
50. See id.  Much weight was subsequently put on Justice Powell’s words.  Investiga-
tions of the Powell Archives at Washington & Lee University School of Law show that
Justice Powell completed his opinion after eight drafts.  The relevant portion of the
opinion remained unchanged from the first draft to the final slip opinion.  Most of the
attention was devoted to the definition of public figure.  John Wade, Dean at Vanderbilt
University School of Law and reporter to the ALI put weight on Justice Powell’s words
in crafting the Defamation portion of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A (1977).  The file in the Archives contains a letter
dated July 12, 1974, from Laurence H. Eldredge, Hastings College of Law, strongly
suggested that Justice Powell’s introduction to part III in Gertz was dicta and did not
dictate a change in the revision.  Letter from Laurence H. Eldredge, Hastings College
of Law, to Dean Wade, July 12, 1974 (on file with the Powell Archives at Washington &
Lee Univ. Sch. of Law).  In a later letter, Eldredge further chastises Wade’s interpreta-
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the premise of a constitutional protection for commentary.  Com-
mentary, at least on matters of public concern, was therefore not
actionable.51  This represented a distinct departure from the com-
mon law where expressions of opinion are accorded a limited pro-
tection under the fair comment defense.52  In Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co.,53 the Supreme Court declared that it had not intended
to create a constitutional protection for opinion or comment.  False
opinions, the Court stated, could be actionable provided that the
claimant could establish requisite fault, malice or negligence, by
the publisher.54  A recognition of the common law’s protection of
comment or opinion would have mitigated some of these transac-
tion costs by allowing a smoother integration of constitutional dic-
tates and common law.
Yet, defamation’s sometimes arcane doctrine and its indirect
means of balancing free speech with reputation was too timorous in
an era of civil rights resolve.  Thus, Sullivan was conceived in high
rhetoric for the very reason of bringing the law out of the shadow of
the Star Chamber.  Under the requirements of the First Amend-
ment, where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, both
public officials and public figures had the burden of showing that
the statement was untrue and of meeting the actual malice
standard.55
tion of Powell’s Gertz, part III as “a fantastic construction of Powell’s opinion. . . . I
respectfully suggest that it carry a: ‘Special Note: This is a Wade Restatement rule which
has never been considered by the American Law Institute.’”  Letter from Laurence H.
Eldredge, Hastings College of Law, to Dean Wade, July 16, 1974 (on file with the Powell
Archives at Washington & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law) (I thank Powell Archivist, John Jacob
for his aid.).  It follows, if Eldredge’s admonition had been accepted, that Justice Pow-
ell’s words should have been treated as mere obiter dicta and should never have formed a
platform for the law of comment/opinion jurisprudence that the federal courts
evolved.
51. See, e.g., Sisemore v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1529 (D.
Alaska 1987).
52. See Kotlikoff v. Cmty. News, 444 A.2d 1086 (N.J. 1982) (finding the fair com-
ment defense no longer relevant).
53. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
54. See id.
55. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773 (1986).
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IV. RECENT AUSTRALIAN AND ENGLISH DECISIONS
In marked contrast with the U.S. Supreme Court, the final ap-
peals courts in Australia and England, as courts of general appeal,
have nurtured and developed common law doctrine, including def-
amation.  Although England and Australia are democracies, and
share a recognition of the value of free speech, they have adopted
different approaches to the clash of free speech and defamation as
reflected in the recent extensions of common law qualified privi-
lege.  The Australian High Court was able to strike this balance by
using a jurisdiction unavailable to the U.S. Supreme Court.  In Aus-
tralia, the High Court may declare the common law for Australia.
Australia’s extension of qualified privilege followed a number
of important and quite remarkable constitutional decisions.56 In
the 1990s, the Australian High Court recognized constitutional im-
plications for the protection of speech.  Although Australia’s consti-
tution does not explicitly protect speech, it has been interpreted to
contain implied protections for political communication pertaining
to government or political matters.57 In Theophanous, Australia’s
High Court used these implied protections to create two new de-
fenses: a constitutional defense for the discussion of political and
government matters and an expanded form of common law quali-
fied privilege.58  The constitutional defense applied as long as de-
fendants could show that they were unaware that the publications
56. See generally Symposium, Constitutional Rights for Australia?, 16 SYDNEY L. REV.
141 (1994). See also Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 C.L.R 1; Australian
Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 C.L.R 106; Theophanous,
(1994) 182 C.L.R 104; Lange, (1997) 189 C.L.R 520; Levy v. State of Victoria (1997) 189
C.L.R 579; Coleman v. Power (2004) 209 A.L.R 182. See generally H.P. LEE, The Implied
Freedom of Political Communication, in AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARKS ch. 16
(H.P. Lee & George Winterton eds., 2003).
57. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd., (1992) 177 C.L.R 106; Nationwide
News Pty. Ltd., (1992) 177 C.L.R 1.  This implication has been controversial. See, e.g.,
GEORGE WILLIAMS, Implications from Representative Government, in HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER
THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION  155-97 (1999); Adrienne Stone, The Limits of Constitu-
tional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication, 23
MELB. U. L. REV. 668 (1999) (raising the problems of constitutional interpretation
posed by the High Court’s decisions); see also Russell L. Weaver & Kathe Boehringer,
Implied Rights and the Australian Constitution: A Modified New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan
Goes Down Under, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 101 (1998).
58. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104 (Austl.). See Stephens v. Western Australian Newspa-
pers, (1994) 182 C.L.R. 211.  For a concise examination of the Theophanous defense and
subsequent developments, see also SALLY WALKER, MEDIA LAW: COMMENTARY AND MATER-
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were false; that they had not published recklessly, without caring
about truth or falsity; and that the act of publication was reasonable
under the circumstances.  The common law qualified privilege ap-
plied to publications about political or government matters.  Ex-
panded qualified privilege was only defeated by malice — that is, an
improper purpose in publishing the material.59 The majority judg-
ments in Theophanous also suggested that political communication
was a broad concept.  It extended to all participants in political dis-
cussion, and included discussion of the “conduct, policies or fitness
for office” of governments, political and public bodies, public of-
ficers, and people seeking public office.60  It also included “discus-
sion of the political views and public conduct of persons who are
engaged in activities that have become the subject of political de-
bate” such as trade union leaders and political commentators.61
Since the High Court was deeply divided in Theophanous, the
Court was better able to revisit the matter in Lange.62  The U.S. Su-
preme Court in Sullivan used the tool of constitutional law to invali-
date the Alabama libel law.  Thus began an exquisite dance of state
common law and federal constitutional law interpretation.  In con-
trast to the United States’ method, the Australian High Court, in
Lange, took the route of shaping the common law of defamation in
light of constitutional demands.63  The Lange judgment combined
elements of Theophanous’s constitutional defense and its expanded
common law qualified privilege defense into a new form of privi-
lege by articulating a list of matters that should be weighed.
Lange’s qualified privilege defense applies to widespread publi-
cations about political and government matters.64  In general,
Lange’s qualified privilege requires defendants to establish that they
had reasonable grounds to believe the publication was true, did not
IALS 207-08 (LBC 2000); MICHAEL GILLOOLY, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION IN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND 188-96 (Federal Press 1998).
59. Roberts v. Bass, (2002) 212 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
60. Theophanous, (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, 124 (Austl.).
61. Id.
62. (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520, 521 (Austl.). See Adrienne Stone, Lange, Levy, and the
Direction of the Freedom of Political Communication Under the Australian Constitution, 21
U.N.S.W.L.J. 117, 119-20 (1998).
63. See (1997) 189 C.R.L. 520, 556, 563 (contrasting the Court’s power to declare
the common law with the position in the United States).
64. See (1997) 189 C.L.R. 520, 574 (Austl.).
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believe it was false, and had made proper inquiries to verify the
publication.65  In addition, defendants must have sought and pub-
lished a response from the potential plaintiff, except where that was
not practical or necessary.66 Lange’s qualified privilege can be de-
feated by malice.  The factors listed by the High Court in Lange are
likely to be important factors in most cases, but they are merely
indicative of when the key requirement of reasonableness has been
met.
Reynolds, a decision of the English House of Lords, is compara-
ble, but also quite different.67  Prior to Reynolds, Parliament had al-
ready altered the common law in important respects.68  It
continued this trend in Reynolds where the House of Lords made a
dramatic shift in holding that common law qualified privilege could
apply to media publications.  The decision extended the traditional
duty and interest requirements for qualified privilege to media pub-
lications on the basis of the public’s right to know, and held that
qualified privilege should focus on matters in the public interest.
As the judgment of Lord Nicholls stated:
Above all, the court should have particular regard to the
importance of freedom of expression.  The press dis-
charges vital functions as a bloodhound as well as a watch-
dog.  The court should be slow to conclude that a
publication was not in the public interest and, therefore,
the public had no right to know, especially when the in-
formation is in the field of political discussion. Any linger-
ing doubts should be resolved in favour of publication.69
The judgment went on to articulate ten factors that should be con-




67. [2001] 2 AC 127 (H.L.). GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER ch. 14 (Patrick Milmo
& W.V.H. Rogers eds. 10th ed. 2004).
68. See Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo., 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, ch. 13 (Eng.); Defama-
tion Act, 1996, ch.13 (Eng.). See also European Convention on Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, Defamation Act, 1952 (adopted into British law by the Human
Rights Act 1998 ch. 42 (Eng.)).
69. Reynolds, [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 205 (H.L.).
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(1) The seriousness of the allegation.  The more serious
the charge, the more the public is misinformed and the
individual harmed. . . . (2) The nature of the information,
and the extent to which the subject matter is a matter of
public concern.  (3) The source of the information.
Some informants have no direct knowledge of the events.
Some have their own axes to grind, or are being paid. . . .
(4) The steps taken to verify the information.  (5) The
status of the information.  The allegation may have al-
ready been the subject of an investigation which com-
mands respect.  (6) The urgency of the matter.  News is
often a perishable commodity.  (7) Whether comment
was sought from the plaintiff. . . . An approach to the
plaintiff will not always be necessary.  (8) Whether the ar-
ticle contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side of the story.
(9) The tone of the article.  A newspaper can raise que-
ries or call for an investigation.  It need not adopt allega-
tions as statements of fact. . . . (10) The circumstances of
the publication, including the timing.70
While Reynolds has captured much attention because of its bold
expansion of the defense of qualified privilege, an early decision of
the House of Lords was a strong harbinger and demonstrates an
enthusiastic embrace of free speech.  In Derbyshire County Council v.
Times Newspapers Ltd., the House of Lords found that a public au-
thority — the Derbyshire Council — could not mount a defamation
action for criticism of its official actions.71  The court cited the need
to hold government accountable as the reason for the ban.  It is
notable that even if the publication were motivated by malice, the
local authority would nevertheless have no cause of action in
defamation.72
70. Id.
71. [1993] A.C. 534. See also RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ANDREW KENYON, DAVID PAR-
TLETT & CLIVE WALKER, THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ILL: DEFAMATION, REPUTATION AND FREE
SPEECH (2006).
72. As in Sullivan, the government’s action is often reified in the action of a public
official.  Thus the U.S. Supreme Court’s inclusion of public officials follows.  The criti-
cism of a public body may however sometimes traduce individuals in their personal
capacity.  Here a good cause of action, despite Sullivan, ought to subsist. See David A.
Elder, Small Town Police Forces, Other Governmental Entities and the Misapplication of the First
Amendment to the Small Group Defamation Theory — A Plea for Fundamental Fairness for May-
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V. ASSESSING SULLIVAN, LANGE AND REYNOLDS
Is one of the three standards (Sullivan, Lange or Reynolds) pref-
erable to the others?  It is difficult to do justice to that question in a
short article, and we will elaborate further in a forthcoming book.73
Nevertheless, certain observations and conclusions are in order.
A. The Common Law
In societies that have attached free speech to democratic val-
ues, the common law became inconsistent with the nurturing of
democracy in complex industrial/information societies.  The bal-
ance between reputation and free speech cut too decisively in favor
of reputation.  Prior to the recent extensions of common law quali-
fied privilege in Reynolds and Lange, the English and Australian me-
dia were fairly cautious and risk adverse compared to the U.S.
media.74  This cautiousness was revealed by the extensive participa-
tion of lawyers in the publishing process, as well as by the standards
that the English media used in deciding whether to publish.75
Rarely would the English media publish without “legally admissible
evidence” to support its conclusions.76  Combined with the willing-
ness of some public figures and officials to aggressively assert their
rights through litigation, editors were unlikely to publish sensitive
information in the public interest without assurances that it could
be legally defended.77
B. Sullivan’s Impact
Post-Sullivan interviews, conducted by the authors, reveal a
U.S. media that functions much differently than either the Austra-
lian or English media (either pre- or post-Lange and Reynolds).  The
interviews reveal a U.S. media that, while not oblivious to the possi-
berry, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 881 (2004) (criticizing Dean v. Dearing, 561 S.E.2d 686 (Va.
2002)).
73. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 71.
74. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 71.
75. Weaver & Bennett, supra note 7, at 1171-72.
76. Weaver & Bennett, supra note 7, at 1173-74.
77. Weaver & Bennett, supra note 7, at 1174. Usual assumptions of risk averseness
would predict even more docility, considering that corporations owning the press are in
highly competitive markets.  The mitigating force is the professional norms of the jour-
nalists.  Owners as utility maximizers must deal with the independent tendencies of
journalists, and this may result in publication in some instances despite legal hazards.
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bility of defamation suits or the possibility of adverse judgments, is
far less concerned about this possibility than their English counter-
parts.  For example, an NPR presenter flatly stated that defamation
laws had no impact on his coverage of issues.78  An Executive Pro-
ducer of CBS’s 60 Minutes made similar statements,79 as did an ex-
ecutive producer at NBC Nightly News,80 a Vice President for News
Practices at CBS,81 a local investigative reporter,82 and a local news
anchor.83  In fact, only one interviewee, a lawyer for a major net-
work, expressed any serious concerns about the impact of United
States defamation laws.84  In other words, Sullivan cut the balance
between reputation and free speech decisively in favor of free
speech.
C. Lange’s Impact
Unlike Sullivan, which appears to have had a major impact on
the U.S. media, Australia’s Lange decision does not appear to have
had so dramatic of an impact.  The Australian interviews, con-
ducted by the authors, began in 1994, slightly before the Theopha-
nous decision and three years before the Lange decision, and some
of the same individuals were interviewed over time.  As a result, the
interviews offer considerable insight into the media’s pre-Theopha-
78. Interview with Anonymous NPR Presenter, National Public Radio, in Wash.,
D.C. (July 23, 1992) [hereinafter Anonymous NPR Interview] (describing defamation
law as having “zip” impact on his coverage).
79. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Executive Producer, 60 Minutes, CBS
in Louisville, Ky. (Oct. 13, 1992) (at the time, the Executive Producer could not remem-
ber ever killing a story for fear of defamation liability (although 60 Minutes did kill a
story later)).
80. Telephone interview with Anonymous Producer, NBC Nightly News with Tom
Brokaw, NBC in Louisville, Ky. (Sept. 22, 1992).
81. Telephone interview with Anonymous Vice President for News Practices, CBS
in Louisville, Ky. (Sept. 22, 1992) (stating that CBS gets sued “sometimes.  Mostly, they
get angry letters or calls.”).
82. Interview with Anonymous Investigative Reporter, WAVE 3 News, in Louisville,
Ky. (Nov. 25, 1997).
83. Telephone Interview with Anonymous News Anchor, WDRB Television, in
Louisville, Ky. (July 8, 1992) (“WDRB television may receive two letters from lawyers a
year regarding its coverage, and is hardly ever sued.  For local news programs, most of
what they report on raises little or no defamation problems.  Problems arise most fre-
quently with regard to investigative stories.”).
84. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Staff Counsel, CBS in Louisville, Ky.
(Oct. 12, 1992).
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nous and Lange conduct and attitudes.85  Subsequent interviews
were conducted in late 1996 and early 1997 (the year in which
Lange was decided, and three years after Theophanous was decided)
and final interviews were conducted in 2003 (six years after Lange
was decided).  Since most of the interviewees remained in their
same positions throughout the interview period, it was possible to
gauge their attitudes over time and draw better conclusions about
how Theophanous and Lange affected their publication decisions.
While Theophanous and Lange have had some impact on report-
ing in Australia, most reporters, editors, producers, and defamation
lawyers agree that the decision has not “come up to expectations.”
Part of the problem lies with the focus on “reasonableness.”  In
making decisions about what to publish or withhold from publica-
tion, few are confident that judges or juries will find that the media
acted reasonably (if, in fact, the media got it wrong).  Defamation
law in the state of New South Wales had included a broader defense
of qualified privilege giving the press protection for “reasonable”
publication, but the provision had been ineffective in promoting
freer political speech.  In addition, the media fears how the courts
will apply the “conduct of government” test.  It remains unclear
how far beyond the electoral sphere the protection will run.86  As a
result, although the Australian media is slightly more “bullish”
about what it publishes following Lange, that decision has not pro-
duced a major change in media psychology.  By and large, the me-
dia is still focused on making sure that it has “legally admissible
evidence” to support allegations, and on proving the truth of what
it publishes.  The media is sometimes reluctant to publish allega-
tions that it believes to be true, but for which it lacks legally admissi-
ble evidence (either because it is unable to obtain that evidence or
because its only sources have chosen to remain anonymous).
Particularly revealing is the caution of publishers of biogra-
phies on Australian public figures.  A biography of Kerry Packer, an
Australian press baron and wealthy businessman, was subjected to a
complete review by a London barrister prior to its publication.  This
comported with usual practice.  Even where investigative journalism
85. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 71, at ch. 5.
86. See Lange v. Atkinson, [1997] 2 N.L.L.R. 22 (H.C.) (facing the same issue in
the test as proposed by the New Zealand Court of Appeal).
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has rooted out crime and corruption, the Australian press post-
Lange continues to be reluctant to publish the names of
protagonists.
Of course, Australia’s defamation rules do not function in iso-
lation.  It is important to note that much of the impact that the
defamation rules have on media conduct is caused not so much by
the law itself as by Australia’s rule on court costs.  The fact that the
losing party in a defamation action is required to pay the opposing
party’s costs, which includes legal fees, has a major impact on the
media.  In deciding what to publish, as well as in deciding what not
to publish, the media is well aware of the costs rule, and in many
cases that rule can have a deterrent effect on the media.
D. Reynolds’s Impact
Although the Reynolds decision has not produced the high
level of protection that resulted from the U.S. Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Sullivan, it does seem to have influenced English defama-
tion law.  Prior to Reynolds, English law tracked the common law
and was protective of reputation.87  In order to publish, the media
needed to be able to prove the truth of the matter asserted or to
bring the article within the scope of a recognized privilege.  As we
have established in our investigations, the media often opted not to
publish for fear of liability.  After Reynolds, some media organiza-
tions are able, and are willing, to publish articles that would have
previously been banished from the page.  So, in this respect, Reyn-
olds represents a more successful extension of qualified privilege
than the Australian decision in Lange.
Despite its positive effect, the English media has concerns re-
garding the Reynolds version of qualified privilege.  The media, in
particular, remains uncertain about how Reynolds multi-factor analy-
sis will be applied.  Because there are so many factors, and because
there have been so few judicial decisions interpreting and applying
Reynolds, the media has only feint signals on how to weigh and eval-
uate the factors.  Must the media always seek a response from the
subject of an article?  If not, when is it permissible not to seek a
87. Cf. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Court of Appeals) (demonstrating an earlier commitment to
freedom of political speech).
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reply?  If the media satisfies some of the Reynolds factors, but not
others, will it nevertheless pass muster?  These concerns may be re-
solved over time as the courts render additional decisions, but such
testing will require a willingness on the part of the press to push
limits.  Owners of the press will be obliged to bear a cost that may
not reap rewards in the market.
Other concerns pose real issues.  For example, the media is
concerned that Reynolds instills as a factor the tone of the publica-
tion.  Even when the English media views a particular situation as
outrageous, and believes that the public interest requires it to de-
clare the outrageousness, few English media outlets would be pre-
pared to do so for fear that they will lose their Reynolds defense.  For
the same reason, the media must also be very careful about the con-
tent and size of their headlines.  Nevertheless, after Reynolds, some
English media find that it is possible to make allegations even if
they need to be put in a restrained tone.88  The English media is
also concerned about the costs of complying with Reynolds.  Al-
though the English media spent significantly more on lawyers than
the United States media prior to Reynolds (e.g., using night lawyers
and barristers to go through newspapers looking for potentially de-
famatory material), the costs have significantly increased in the
post-Reynolds era.  Not only did all newspapers retain the night law-
yers and barristers, they also use lawyers to “Reynoldize” pieces.89
In the final analysis, Reynolds is a major development in English
defamation law that with the influence of free speech directives em-
anating from developing Human Rights norms under the Euro-
pean Convention, will entrench the force of free speech.  While
Reynolds may not have found the best balance between speech and
reputation (assuming that such a “best” balance exists), it is a rich
decision that joins Sullivan in providing protection to free speech
in modern democracies.
88. See, e.g., Andrew T. Kenyon, Lange and Reynolds Qualified Privilege: Australian
and English Defamation Law and Practice, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 406 (2004).
89. It should be noted that Sullivan and its progeny have led to a similar tendency
of “judicializing” journalistic practice under the “actual malice” test.  For trenchant dis-
cussion, see Brian C. Murchison et al., Sullivan’s Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial Stan-
dards of Journalism, 73 N.C. L. REV. 7 (1994). The dynamic between editors, proprietors,
and journalists is yet to be explored in a systematic way. For the role of journalists’
standards, see Lynn Wickham Hartman, Standards Governing the News: Their Use, Their
Character, and Their Legal Implications, 72 IOWA L. REV. 637 (1987).
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CONCLUSION
Over the last four decades, the common law of defamation has
steadily given way in favor of free speech.  The protection of reputa-
tion, the touchstone of defamation liability for centuries, has slowly
but surely eroded as societies grant greater protection to free
speech principles.  While Sullivan was decided first, and undoubt-
edly influenced decisions in other countries, most Commonwealth
members have crafted rules to comport with their legal traditions
and coordinate with differing social norms.  In Lange and Reynolds,
respectively, Australia and England opted to extend common law
qualified privilege rather than to adopt Sullivan’s “actual malice”
standard.
The question often asked is whether one standard is preferable
to the other, and cuts a better balance between reputation and free
speech.  No single metric is available by which that question can be
answered.  The health of a democracy depends upon free and ro-
bust speech.  Legal dictates in the law relating to defamation, pri-
vacy, contempt, and press regulation play a critical role.  Beyond
substantive law, our political and social institutions are fundamen-
tal.  For example, a Parliament or Congress that encourages real
debate about social issues is a pillar upon which democracy rests.
While differences are obvious, two factors make the compari-
son useful and compelling for free speech analysis.  The first is the
common law tradition of those jurisdictions that are the subject of
this short analysis.  The second is the palpable shift in the last three
decades to viewing the reality of freedom in terms of legal rights.
Sullivan was a product of the civil rights movement where the mi-
nority was empowered through judicially interpreted constitutional
rights.  The most notable example of this empowerment was Brown
v. Board of Education, recently celebrating its 50th anniversary.90
The legal tradition in England and Australia also eschewed the cre-
ation of new legal rights through codification of human rights.
However, in England and Australia the rhetorical force of funda-
mental freedoms, as enunciated in legal rights, was to win the day.
Our analysis shows that the grand rhetoric of the First Amendment
90. See 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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is not necessary for a legal shift to take place emphasizing the place
of free speech.
A bill of rights that gives courts the ability to declare rights is so
powerful that American commentators often fail to appreciate the
more subtle protections under the common law and of political in-
stitutions.  The gravitational pull of the U.S. legal institutions, and
the need to harness the expressive power of the law, in reaction to
the assaults on freedom before and during the Second World War
that codified rights enforceable through the courts,91 led to an ac-
ceptance beyond the United States of the desirability of legally en-
forceable rights.92
As our analysis demonstrates, the road to promoting free
speech and reputation varies.93  If anything our argument ought to
be an antidote to those who view the balance reached under Sulli-
van as the distillation of all wisdom.  It is surprising for non-Ameri-
cans to witness the United States press’s reaction to the Australian
High Court decision in Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick.94  In an inter-
91. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights resulted from the atrocities of the
Second World War.  (G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/
810 (Dec. 10, 1948)).  This was followed by the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171).  Canada has enacted the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.)), the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, No. 109, and
the U.K. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, embodying the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, (Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221).
92. For more on recognition of privacy as an enforceable right in tort law, see
Basil Markensinis, Colm O’Cinneide, Jorg Fedtke & Myriam Hunter-Henin, Concerns
and Ideas About the Developing English Law of Privacy (And How Knowledge of Foreign Law
Might be of Help), 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 133 (2004); Andrew Geddis, Hosking v. Runting: A
Privacy Tort for New Zealand, 13 TORT L. REV. 5 (2005).
93. Cf. Partlett, The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 and the Anti-Discrimination Act
1977: Aspects and Proposals for Change, 2 U.N.S.W.L.J. 152 (1977).  Witness the different
schemes for the protection of racial, ethnic and other minorities from discrimination.
In the United States, the constitution has played the dominant role.  In the remainder
of the common law world various legislatures came to a negotiation of the desirability of
protecting minorities from discrimination.
94. (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575.  For press commentary, see Editorial, A Blow to Online
Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2002, at 34; Editorial, Down (Under) With the Internet, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 11, 2002, at 18; Brian Fitzgerald, Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick:  Negotiating
“American Legal Hegemony” in the Transnational World of Cyberspace, 27 MELB. U. L. REV.
590, 593 (2003); Richard Garnett, Dow Jones and Co. Inc. v. Gutnick — An Adequate
Reponse to Transnational Internet Defamation?, 4 MELB. J. INT’L. L. 196, 207 (2003); Shawn
A. Bone, Note, Private Harms in the Cyber-World: The Conundrum of Choice of Law for Defa-
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connected world the versions of the balance of free speech, reputa-
tion, and privacy will be much debated.  The technology that gives
the comparative law salience will itself lead to a new vision of free
speech as a democratic principle.95  It is on this changing canvas
that the courts of liberal democracies will continue to paint free
speech as universal, critical, and monolithic.
mation Posed by Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co., 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 279 (2005)
(describing the case in context of U.S. and Australian precedents, its policy implications
and suggestions for reform to adequately protect free speech).  Berezovsky v. Michaels,
[2000] 1 W.L.R. 1004 (The English House of Lords accepting that English courts had
jurisdiction and applying English law for a Barron’s article on the Russian politician and
businessman Boris Berezovsky). See also Law Commission on Defamation and the Internet:  A
Preliminary Investigation, at 39 (2002), http://news.baou.com/documents/pdf/defama-
tion2.pdf (noting the issues and suggesting that a solution would require “a greater
harmonization of the substantive law of defamation”).
The latest salvo in the Internet defamation war was fired by the English Court of
Appeal in Lewis v. King [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1329.  The court had before it an Internet
defamation dispute regarding several postings made to boxing websites concerning the
actions of Don King.  In particular, one posting accused Mr. King of anti-Semitic com-
ments, which Mr. King claimed defamed his reputation among the Jewish community
in England.  The alleged defamatory statements central to the English case came (1)
from a piece written in the United States by the New York attorney representing the
defendants and posted on the Internet, and (2) from an interview given by that same
attorney to a website based in California where the attorney had posted the complaint
in the dispute days before.  The Court of Appeal ruled that Don King could sue in
England for his harm suffered there.  Even though all of the factual events leading up
to the English action occurred in the United States, and even though the applicable
United States’ law would likely have doomed a case of action under the public figure
doctrine in Sullivan, the English Court of Appeal was untroubled by the lower court’s
refusal to dismiss King’s case.  The English Court refusing to accept the “single publica-
tion rule,” found that the case could proceed on the basis of King’s reputational harm
in England. Id. at ¶ 31.
95. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expres-
sion for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (pointing out both the potenti-
alities and obstacles for democratic culture in the digital age).
